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Abstract
Because of evidence of causal association between antibiotic use and bacter-
ial resistance, the implementation of national policies has emerged as a interest-
ing tool for controlling and reversing bacterial resistance. The aim of this study
is to assess the impact of public policies on antibiotic use in Europe using a
di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach. Comparable data on systemic administered
antibiotics in 21 European countries are available for a 11-years panel between
1997 and 2007. Data on national campaigns are drawn from the public health
literature. We estimate an econometric model of antibiotic consumption with
country xed e¤ects and control for the main socioeconomic and epidemiologi-
cal factors. Lagged values and the instrumental variables approach are applied
to address endogeneity aspects of the prevalence of infections and the adoption
of national campaigns. We nd evidence that public campaigns signicantly
reduce the use of antimicrobials in the community by 1:3 to 5:6 dened daily
doses per 1; 000 inhabitants yearly. This roughly represents an impact between
6:5% and 28:3% on the mean level of antibiotic use in Europe between 1997 and
2007. The e¤ect is robust across di¤erent measurement methods. Further re-
search is needed to investigate the e¤ectiveness of policy interventions targeting
di¤erent social groups such as general practitioners or patients.
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1 Introduction
The overuse of antibiotics is the main force driving the increase of bacterial resis-
tance, which represents a major threat to public health. Antimicrobials may lose
e¤ectiveness since they are frequently prescribed for viral infections [1] or can be
obtained without an o¢ cial medical prescription [2, 3]. Large volumes of antimicro-
bials are also used in agriculture and veterinary medicine, and in many consumer
products where benets are often unclear [4]. As illustrated in Figure 1, di¤erences
across European countries in antibiotic prescribing practices measured in dened
daily doses per 1,000 inhabitants (DID) partially mirror di¤erences in the levels of
bacterial resistance captured by the rate of penicillin-non-susceptible Streptococcus
pneumoniae isolates (PNSP) [5, 6].
E¤orts to reduce bacterial resistance through a control of antibiotic use include
the limitation of prescriptions, surveillance, and a more careful use of antibiotics in
agriculture. More recently, public authorities have taken an interest in encouraging
appropriate consumption of antibiotics in the community [7, 8]. Cost-e¤ectiveness
studies on antibiotic treatments are now developed to consider the inuence of bac-
terial resistance [9]. Because the association between antibiotic use and bacterial
resistance may cross regional borders within countries, the implementation of na-
tional policies towards antibiotic consumption has emerged as an important tool for
controlling and reversing bacterial resistance. However, the e¤ects of these policies
are still unclear.
Several studies describe and review national policies towards antibiotic consump-
tion in specic countries. Goossens et al. [10] and Chahwakilian et al. [11], for
instance, consider policies towards the e¢ cient use of antibiotics in Belgium and
France. However, the literature lacks studies providing empirical evidence on the
impact of national policies across Europe. Huttner et al. [12] summarize the char-
acteristics of public campaigns in high-income countries but fail to provide su¢ cient
statistical evidence on their impact. An econometric approach is used by Masiero et
al. [13] to investigate socioeconomic determinants of antibiotic use across Europe.
The authors do not account for the e¤ects of public policies towards the consumption
of antimicrobials.
The aim of this study is to assess the impact of public education campaigns on
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antibiotic use in Europe by means of a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach, a largely
used empirical methodology on the e¤ects of various treatments [14]. We draw
information on national campaigns from the public health literature and use data
publicly available on antibiotic consumption and socioeconomic determinants for an
11-years period (1997-2007). We control for unobserved individual heterogeneity by
means of xed-e¤ects estimations and address endogeneity aspects of infections and
policies with lagged and instrumental variables methods.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the literature on policies
towards the use of antibiotics and provide a brief overview of public interventions
implemented in the European countries. In section 3 we propose an econometric
model of antibiotic consumption where the impact of national campaigns is assessed
after controlling for the main determinants of consumption. Data are described in
section 4. Estimation results and discussion of main ndings are presented in section
5. Section 6 summarizes the methodology and the main ndings of our exercise, and
suggests possible improvements of current research.
2 Public policies aiming to reduce antibiotic consump-
tion
Antimicrobial agents represent a scarce resource since their e¤ectiveness decreases
with consumption because of bacterial resistance. Di¤erent interventions may act
as an e¤ective way to tackle the problem. These can be characterized according to
the type of intervention, the geographical area involved, the targeted agents, the
instruments used and their message.
As for the type of intervention, policies to improve the use of antibiotics can
be categorized in four classes according to the list proposed by Quick et al. [15].
There are educational interventions which are persuasive and consider training of
prescribers by means of seminars, workshops, face to face or supervisory visits, and
assorted printed materials aimed at patients or prescribers. Managerial strategies
aim at guiding decision-making. They concentrate, for instance, on carrying drug
utilization reviews, giving cost information, following standard treatment guidelines
to prescribe, and encouraging to complete the full course of antibiotic therapy, for
instance o¤ering a full course of treatment in a single dose. Regulatory interventions
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legally constraint prescribers to control their decision making via instruments such
as registering drugs for marketing, licensing prescribers, and limiting prescribing
or dispensing. Finally, economic interventions aim at providing nancial incentives
to institutions, providers and patients. The e¤ects of these strategies crucially de-
pend on the pricing structure, the price setting and the reimbursement mechanism
adopted.
Among the educational strategies that promote the appropriate use of antibi-
otics and that raise the public awareness of bacterial resistance, public campaigns
are one of the most widely used. In European countries, national or regional health
authorities are in charge of adopting these campaigns, depending on the level of de-
centralization of the health care systems. Although antibiotic policies can be imple-
mented at national or subnational level, public campaigns are generally implemented
within a national strategy to abate resistance to antimicrobials [12]. International
organizations are sometimes involved. Rudholm [16] suggests that the problem of
resistance is a global one. Consequently, optimal policies should consider the fact
that antibiotic resistance can cross country borders and travel far distances. Coast
et al. [17] argue that policies aimed at reducing antibiotic use within a country may
not work in another country since local epidemiological factors a¤ect the spreading
mechanism of antibiotic resistance. González Ortiz and Masiero [18] suggest that
regional policies could blunt the impact of policies in neighbouring regions through
the generation of local spillovers.
As observed by Huttner et al. [12], the majority of public campaigns are ad-
dressed to the general public, focusing on parents of young children. Health-care
professionals, specically primary care physicians, are also targeted. The public is
targeted by distributing informational material to patients and by displaying posters
in waiting rooms and pharmacies. General practitioners receive educational mate-
rial such as guidelines, information sheets and booklets. Some campaigns combine
di¤erent instruments such as advertising on television and radio networks, news-
papers and public transports, through the internet or using billboards. The use
of the internet to spread information about the program is common to almost all
campaigns.
Finally, regarding the message of the intervention, Huttner et al. [12] explain
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that most campaigns attempt to inform the public that antibiotics are not needed
for treating viral infections. They focus on respiratory tract infections and combine
negative and positive messages. The main message is that bacterial resistance is a
major public health issue largely caused by the misuse of antibiotics. This encourages
people to follow rigorously the antibiotic dosage regime prescribed by the physician.
2.1 Previous studies on the impact of antibiotic policies
The literature on the impact of antibiotic policies is limited to studies using a de-
scriptive and qualitative approach. Goossens et al. [10] analyse national campaigns
in two European countries with high antibiotic use, Belgium and France, between
1997 and 2003.1 To assess the impact of antibiotic policies, the authors compare
rates of antibiotic consumption between the two countries and England, where the
rates of antibiotic use are lower and persistent. Findings suggest evidence of reduced
antibiotic prescribing in both countries. However, these ndings cannot be general-
ized to countries with lower or already declining levels of antibiotic use. Moreover,
the study does not control for di¤erences between the two countries related to the
impact of infections, the characteristics of prescribers or demographic aspects over
the time period considered.
To assess the impact of antibiotic policies in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, Cizman et al. [19] administer a questionnaire to national representatives. The
questionnaire includes information about national antimicrobial resistance surveil-
lance, national consumption of antibiotics in the community and in hospitals, and
strategies to optimize the use of antimicrobials. The authors identify countries which
have restricted the use of some antibiotics for outpatients and inpatients and briey
describe other types of interventions implemented by these countries. Findings show
that only few countries have restricted the use of antimicrobials in ambulatory care,
as compared to the common practice of restricting the use of antibiotics in hospitals.
The authors realize that antibiotic policy interventions are lacking or only apply to
specic interventions or problems.
Using an exhaustive search strategy and structured interviews, Huttner et al.
1For more evidence on the impact of the French campaign to reduce inappropriate use of an-
tibiotics, see also the recent study by Chahwakilian et al. [11] who analyse trends in antibiotic
prescriptions between 1980 and 2009.
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[12] classify and examine the characteristics and outcomes of 22 public campaigns
for a more rational use of antibiotics implemented at national or regional level in
high-income countries between 1990 and 2007. The majority of these campaigns (16)
are located in Europe. Looking at data on the consumption of outpatient antibiotics,
the authors try to evaluate the e¤ect of the campaigns. The study concludes that
probably there is a relationship between a decline in the use of antibiotics and the
implementation of public campaigns. However, this conclusion is based on a qual-
itative analysis rather than on a statistical or econometric analysis. The approach
has some shortcomings since most campaigns do not include a control population
and trends in consumption before the interventions are not considered. The analysis
cannot clarify whether antibiotic consumption would still have increased without the
campaign or if the duration of the intervention was too short to observe measurable
e¤ects.
In conclusion, evidence presented in empirical studies on the impact of antibiotic
policies is currently weak, mainly based on descriptive statistics and graphical analy-
sis. In the following section, we will use an econometric approach to provide more
convincing evidence of the association between the adoption of antibiotic policies
and antibiotic consumption rates.
3 The empirical approach
To investigate the e¤ects of national campaigns for a more rational use of antibiotics,
we estimate a model of outpatient antibiotic consumption using a panel data set for
a sample of 21 European countries over the period 1997-2007. The model serves as
a reduced form that considers both demand- and supply-side factors. In our simple
frame, individuals are assumed to follow doctorsprescriptions and to be compliant
with the antibiotic therapy.2 We hypothesize that the consumption of outpatient
antibiotics depends upon sociodemographic characteristics of the population, indi-
vidualshealth status, antibiotic price, the characteristics of health care supply and
2Antibiotic consumption data generally derive from reimbursement data or distribution/sales
data, depending on the method for measuring antibiotic use employed by each national database.
Assuming patients non-compliance to be a negligible factor implies that the quantity of antibiotics
sold matches the quantity actually consumed. The latter is associated to antimicrobial resistance
and represents the target of antibiotic policies.
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the adoption of national campaigns to improve the use of antibiotics.
Antibiotic prescribing practices vary widely across European countries. Mean
gures of dened daily doses per 1,000 inhabitants for 21 countries collected by the
European Surveillance of Antimicrobial Consumption (ESAC) project between 1997
and 2007 show that France, Greece, and Luxembourg, among others, exhibit signif-
icantly higher values of antibiotic use than Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands
(see Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix).3 Some of these countries
implemented policy interventions to reduce antibiotic consumption during the period
considered; other countries did not adopt any type of public campaign.4 Figure 3
provides an illustration of the adoption of national campaigns to improve antibiotic
use in Europe. We refer the reader to section 4 for details about the construction of
this gure.
Since we have information on antibiotic consumption before and after a policy
instrument has been introduced, we are able to estimate the e¤ect of policy inter-
ventions using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DD) approach [14].5 The general idea
of this approach is to compare the outcome, in our case the per capita consump-
tion of antibiotics, of two groups of countries before and after the introduction of a
campaign. One group, denoted the control, is composed of countries that did not
introduce any policy instrument to reduce antibiotic consumption. The other group,
the treatment, includes all countries that have adopted some policy measures. The
control group and the treatment group change in each year since countries did not
implement campaigns at the same time. Looking at di¤erences in the outcomes
3Data are reliable and exhibit a good degree of comparability since the ESAC network screens for
detection bias in sample and census data, bias by over-the counter sales and parallel trade, errors
in assigning medicinal product packages to the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classication
(ATC), and errors in calculations of dened daily doses [20].
4Public campaigns and policies are used interchangeably throughout the remaining of the paper.
The reader should be aware that public campaigns represent a subset of possible antibiotic policies.
The Netherlands, for instance, have strong antibiotic policies in place although the country did not
conduct any public campaign during the study period.
5 In the literature, several approaches are discussed to estimate the causal impact of a treatment
variableon an outcome variable, such as the di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimator and the propensity
score matching estimator. In this study, we use a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach because of the
relatively small panel data set with observations at the country level rather than at individual level.
Using a propensity score matching approach requires, for instance, a large data set regarding the
number of variables and the sample size. For a discussion on this issue, we refer the reader to
studies by Frolich [21] and Heinrich, Ma¢ oli and Vázquez [22].
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observed between the two groups after the introduction of a policy, we can then
estimate the impact of antibiotic policy interventions. The typical DD estimation
with panel data with more than two periods considers countries and years xed ef-
fects. Therefore, our estimation method exploits both the within-country variation
as well as the comparison between countries, and takes into account unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity.
Our empirical approach draws from Giavazzi and Tabellini [23], who apply a
DD technique to a large sample of countries to investigate the impact of economic
and political liberalizations on economic performance, macroeconomic policy and
structural policies. We estimate the following model in the whole sample of treated
and control countries:
DIDit =   POLICYit +   xit + !i + t + "it, (1)
where DIDit denotes dened daily doses of antibiotic consumption per 1,000 in-
habitants in country i at time t; POLICYit is a dummy variable which assumes a
value equal to 1 only in the year of policy implementation, and 0 otherwise. xit
is a vector of other covariates which includes the per capita national income (Yit),
the physiciansdensity (DPHit), the percentage of the population below 14 years
of age, between 15 and 24, 25 and 64, 65 and 79, and over 80 (POP1it. . . POP5it),
the price level of pharmaceuticals (Pit), and the population health status measured
by the impact of infectious diseases (INFit). !i captures the country-level xed
e¤ects, which are assumed constant over time and take unobserved time-invariant
variables, such as cultural aspects, into account. t is the year-specic xed e¤ect,
which is assumed constant across countries. Finally, "it is an unobserved error term
with Z distribution. Note that model (1) is a common generalization of the most
basic DD setup, which is valid under the restrictive assumption that changes in the
consumption of antibiotics over time would have been the same in both treatment
and control groups in the absence of the campaign.
By including both time and country xed e¤ects in Equation (1), we are able to
disentangle the impact of public campaigns per se from other determinants related to
country characteristics or time e¤ects.6 The main coe¢ cient of interest is 1 which
6 Initially, we also estimate Equation (1) using ordinary least-squares (OLS) and random e¤ects
(RE) approaches.
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measures the e¤ect of public campaigns on antibiotic consumption. A negative and
signicant coe¢ cient would suggest that antibiotic policies were e¤ective in reducing
antibiotic consumption over the period 1997-2007.
To correctly identify the impact of antibiotic policy interventions, the economet-
ric model has to satisfy some assumptions. First, we need to exclude the presence
of unobserved variables a¤ecting antibiotic consumption that move systematically
over time in a di¤erent way between the two groups of countries. This does not ex-
clude to observe individual patterns within each group. Although in our analysis all
countries belong to Europe, the general trend in antibiotic consumption may not be
the same. Indeed, European countries showed di¤erent trends even in the absence of
campaigns. However, we do not observe di¤erent geographical or political clusters
between the two groups of countries.
The possibility of unobserved heterogeneity bias may not be negligible even
though our regressions include important socioeconomic determinants of di¤erences
in antibiotic use across countries (xit), such as income, the population age struc-
ture, and the density of practitioners. Generally, unobserved heterogeneity in the
use of antibiotics among countries, such as cultural factors, are notoriously di¢ cult
to measure and may also be present. See, for instance, the studies by Borg [24], De-
schepper et al. [25] and Harbarth et al. [26]. Although we cannot explicitly account
for cultural aspects, the xed-e¤ects approach should consider at least partially these
e¤ects. Moreover, if cultural di¤erences between the two groups of countries - with
and without policies - are stable over time, the estimated e¤ect of public campaigns
should not be biased.
One further assumption that will be relaxed later in the analysis is that the
decision to introduce a public campaign is independent of the level of antibiotic
consumption in a country, i.e. policies are exogenous. This implies that pressure
to promote information campaigns does not depend directly on antibiotic consump-
tion. More likely, it depends on the increasing levels of antibiotic resistance. Still,
this is a limitation since antibiotic resistance is partially caused by the consumption
of antibiotics, which may then indirectly inuence the adoption of antibiotic poli-
cies. Moreover, the link between antibiotic use and antimicrobial resistance is now
well documented and we cannot exclude that some countries may have conducted
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campaigns because of high levels of antibiotic consumption.
From an econometric point of view, if campaigns are non-random and occur more
frequently where the chance of success is higher, then the estimate of the average
treatment e¤ect may be biased. As mentioned before, we control for this unob-
served heterogeneity by means of a FE approach with clusters by country. However,
the above relationship between antimicrobial resistance and antibiotic consumption
generates an endogeneity problem, which may also lead to biased results in the es-
timation of Equation (1). For this reason, we check the robustness of our initial
results (Model 1) by endogenizing the policy variable using an instrumental vari-
able approach (Model 2). As we will discuss later, the use of instrumental variables
decreases the number of observations. The density of foreign population and the pro-
duction of milk and pig meat are used as instruments for policies. These variables
also indirectly measure the level of bacterial resistance within a country. Masiero et
al. [13] observe that these instruments are well correlated with bacterial resistance.
Levels of bacterial resistance can be related to the extensive use of antibiotics in
agriculture and in animal breeding. For instance, Campylobacter is the most fre-
quently reported zoonotic pathogen to cause human illnesses, and resistant bacteria
tend to be harboured in the meat produced [27]. The common practice of using milk
produced during antibiotic treatment for feeding calves and pigs causes a marked
selection for resistant bacterial strains (i.e. enterococci) which may enter the food
chain. Finally, the density of foreign population may be considered an indicator
of people movements across countries, which increases the spread of bacterial resis-
tance [16]. In contrast to bacterial resistance, our instrumental variables are poorly
correlated with antibiotic use. Consequently, we believe they can reasonably be used
as appropriate instruments for policies.
Another explanatory variable is potentially endogenous in our model: the pop-
ulation health status which is captured by mortality for infectious diseases. Infec-
tions are potentially endogenous since a low level of antibiotic use may favour poorer
health conditions in the population, e.g. an increased spreading of severe infections.
To tackle this problem, we estimate our models using the lagged mortality rate for
infectious diseases (INFit instead of INFit 1). This is a simple instrumental vari-
able approach, though pretty e¢ cacious. The variation within the observations of
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each country for this variable is in general as large as the variation of other covari-
ates and higher than the within variation in the consumption of antibiotics. For
robustness check, we also estimate our models using a two-period lagged mortality
rate for infectious diseases. The main results are conrmed. Finally, we can rule out
possible endogeneity regarding the price variable (Pit) since this is constructed by
combining the harmonized annual average price index for pharmaceuticals (HICP)
and the comparative price level index (PLI), as explained later in section 4.
One last issue is that the DD estimation results can be a¤ected by positive
serial correlation. Although this correlation does not bias the estimated average
treatment e¤ect, it could lead to underestimate the standard error and to reject
the null hypothesis of no e¤ect of public campaigns. To cope with this problem,
we report standards errors clustered by country.7 Note also that the variation over
time in our data is not negligible and represents around 30% of total variation.
4 Data
The consumption rate of antibiotics is available for 21 European countries between
1997 and 2007. This is collected by the European Surveillance of Antimicrobial
Consumption (ESAC) project. The consumption rate is most commonly expressed
as the number of dened daily doses (DDD) per 1,000 inhabitants per day (DID).
The DDD is a technical unit based on the assumed average maintenance dose per
day for a drug used for its main indication in adults. Antibiotic use is standardized
using the ATC=DDD index for international drug consumption studies [30].8
Annual data available on the determinants of outpatient antibiotic use are sum-
marised in Table 1. Details for each country are provided in Tables 3 and 4 in the
Appendix. These determinants include socioeconomic characteristics of the popula-
7As discussed by Bertrand et al. [14], conventional di¤erences-in-di¤erences standard errors may
be biased because of serial correlation. A solution proposed by Arellano [28] is to compute cluster-
robust standard errors. Kezdi [29] shows that cluster-robust estimates perform well in typical-sized
panels, although they can be slightly biased downward if the number of countries is very small.
In a Monte Carlo experiment, Kezdi [29] considers N=10 to be a very small number of countries.
In our case, N is equal to 20. Therefore, although the sample is relatively small, we believe that
cluster-robust standard errors represent a viable solution to autocorrelation.
8Although comparing antibiotic use among countries using DDD has a large consensus among
researchers, one limitation is that this measure is not appropriate for all age groups. Indeed, using
other measures may give di¤erent results as illustrated by Goossens et al. [31].
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tion (income and demographic structure), supply-side factors (density of doctors),
price of pharmaceuticals, and the incidence of bacterial infections measured by the
rate of mortality.9 We use the mortality rate for infectious diseases as a proxy for
the incidence of infections since morbidity indicators are less complete and reliable.
Data are obtained from a variety of sources. Information on the per capita income
(measured in US dollars in purchasing power parity), the density of physicians, and
the incidence of infections are extracted from publications by the OECD [32].10
The demographic structure of the population is derived from Eurostat tables [33].
Information on instruments for policies (population density, production of milk and
pig meat) are also obtained from the Eurostat statistics [33].
Since antibiotic prices are not easily available for all countries and years, we
approximate price levels for antibiotics using the pharmaceutical price index. This
is clearly a more general price index as compared to the antibiotic price index.
Still, antibiotics represent a considerable part of all pharmaceutical sales and their
prices are likely well correlated with the pharmaceutical price index in all countries.
The harmonized annual average price index for pharmaceutical products (HICP)
provided by Eurostat [33] includes information on price trends for pharmaceuticals
for each country between 2000 and 2005, where 2005=100. Since this price index is
equal to 100 for all countries in 2005, we rescale the pharmaceutical index of each
country using the comparative price level index (PLI) which varies across countries.
The PLI indicates the price level of each country compared to the average price
level of the 25 EU countries in 2005. Using this index is equivalent to assuming that
di¤erences in pharmaceutical prices across countries reect di¤erences in the general
level of prices.
As for public campaigns, data collection is cumbersome and may result in in-
complete data. Moreover, little information is available in scientic journals. For
our purpose, we draw the information on campaign characteristics from the recent
review by Huttner et al. [12]. The authors identify public campaigns implemented
9 Information on mortality for infectious diseases and price of pharmaceuticals are not available
for all countries or years. This reduces the total number of observations in our nal regressions.
10 It is important to underline that this variable is obtained from OECD data and is likely di¢ cult
to compare between countries. Mortality for infectious diseases is generally based on diagnostic
discharge codes. Consequently, di¤erences among countries may depend on di¤erent methods of
determining this variable.
12
at national level in high income countries between 1990 and 2007. Using informa-
tion from this study, we generate a dummy variable (POLICY1) which takes a value
equal to 1 in the year of implementation of the campaign, and 0 in the pre-campaign
and post-campaign years (see Figure 3). As an example, consider a country, for in-
stance Belgium. Huttner et al. [12] register that this country implemented a national
campaign from 2000, except in winter 2003-2004. Consequently, our policy dummy
assumes value 1 between 2000 and 2002 and between 2004 and 2007, and 0 in 2003.
Alternatively, we consider a di¤erent policy indicator (POLICY2). This is a dummy
variable which takes the value 1 in the years of campaign adoption and in the years
post-campaign, and 0 in years before the campaign is adopted. To complete our
example, the policy dummy (POLICY2) for Belgium takes the value 1 in all years
from 2000 until 2007. The construction of these indicators has been facilitated by
some similar characteristics of the campaigns such as their main message. However,
as shown by Huttner et al. [12], other characteristics (e.g. the intensity of the
campaigns) may vary signicantly, which is not taken into account by our policy
measures. We are also aware that our policy indicators may su¤er from other lim-
itations discussed in the review by Huttner et al. [12]. Some campaigns were not
included in the review due to limitations in the search method or available informa-
tion. Since we focus on national campaigns, we exclude campaigns implemented at
regional level within a country (e.g. Emilia Romagna for Italy). Moreover, we can-
not exclude that some countries adopted strategies to reduce antibiotic consumption
other than public campaigns. Although we are aware of possible missing data to
correctly identify all types of campaigns, these missing policies could be highly het-
erogeneous and, consequently, hardly measurable by means of appropriate variables.
However, we do not see specic reasons why excluded campaigns should a¤ect the
control group of countries di¤erently from the treatment group.
Since almost all countries implemented some policies to increase the public aware-
ness of antibiotic use from 2000, and in order to have a satisfactory control group, we
excluded Iceland from the nal dataset. Iceland adopted a campaign at the begin-
ning of the period considered (1997 and 1998). The nal dataset is an unbalanced
panel dataset with 153 observations for Model 1 and 122 observations for Model
2. Since information on instrumental variables for policies is not available for all
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countries or years, the number of observations in Model 2 is lower. Estimations are
performed by means of the statistical software STATA (version 11.1) developed by
the StataCorp LP, USA.
5 Results
Our initial tests indicate that the OLS model can be rejected in favour of the xed
e¤ects model (FE).11 The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test indicates
that there are other e¤ects than those captured by the exogenous variables in OLS
regressions. The F test that constant terms are homogeneous across regions and
time periods is also rejected. Moreover, the Hausman test suggests that the FE
approach should be preferred to the random e¤ects approach. The parameter esti-
mates obtained using the DD estimator are reported in Table 2 (Model 1). Table 2
also reports the results of the two-stage least squares regression (Model 2) to correct
for endogeneity.
As explained in section 3, all regressions include country xed e¤ects and year
dummy variables. The results are stable and no structural di¤erences is observed
across the two models. Time dummies do not show any signicant increase in the
use of outpatient antibiotics per capita over time. In both models some coe¢ cients
are statistically signicant and carry the expected sign. The relatively low number
of statistically signicant coe¢ cients of socioeconomic variables could be explained,
as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi [34], by the low within variation of these
variables. The number of signicant coe¢ cients increases in the two-stage least
squares model. Although this is worth of notice, we remind the reader that our
main goal is to estimate the coe¢ cient of the policy dummy variable using a DD
approach.
11Preliminary OLS regressions show an R2 adjusted of 0.59. The goodness of t slighly increases
with the inclusion of temporal dummy variables. The F test is 24.58 (12.51 with time dummies).
This suggests that overall regressors have a signicant impact on the dependent variable. Moreover,
the mean Variance Ination Factor is lower than 3. Finally, the Shapiro-Wilk test as well as the
Jarque-Bera test for normality of errors cannot be rejected using the conventional 95% level of
signicance.
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5.1 E¤ects of policies
The e¤ects of antibiotic policies on outpatient antibiotic consumption are reported
in Table 2. As explained in section 3, the control group consists of all the countries
that did not go through a public campaign to improve antibiotic use during 1997-
2007. Thus, when we study the e¤ects of public campaigns, the controls are the
countries that did not adopt any campaign. We remind the reader that our control
and treatment groups can change in each year since countries did not implement
campaigns at the same time. Moreover, our estimation method exploits both the
within-country variation as well as the comparison between groups.
The variable POLICY1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the year of adoption
of the campaign and 0 afterwards for the treated countries only. Its estimated
coe¢ cient captures the average e¤ect of the policy. In line with our expectations,
policy coe¢ cients are signicant in both models. The dummy variable shows a
negative sign, which suggests that the implementation of public campaigns leads to
a reduction in the use of antibiotics. One could speculate that individuals informed
about the social implications of antibiotic use are more likely to use antibiotics
carefully.12
Using the estimated coe¢ cients of POLICY1 in Model 1 and Model 2, we observe
that the implementation of a public campaign may reduce antibiotic consumption
by 1.3 to 5.6 dened daily doses per 1,000 inhabitants. This roughly represents
an impact between 6.5% and 28.3% on the mean level of antibiotic use in Europe
between 1997 and 2007.
Our results cannot be easily compared with earlier ndings in the literature.
There is no comparable study we are aware of on the association between outpatient
antibiotic use and public campaigns. The few papers that have investigated the
12The results are conrmed if we include in the model the dummy variable POLICY2 instead of
POLICY1. This takes the value equal to 1 in the years of campaign adoption as well as in the years
post-campaign. The rationale of this indicator is that policies may take some time to show their
e¤ects or may have carryover e¤ects. Although POLICY1 seems to reect more closely information
collected in the review by Huttner et al. [12], POLICY2 may provide a robustness check of our
results based on POLICY1. Since countries in the treatment group are assumed to implement
policies for longer periods under POLICY2 than under POLICY1, the e¤ect of policies could be
bias. We nd that the estimated coe¢ cients of POLICY2 are slighly less signicant than the
coe¢ cients of POLICY1, which conrms the results and may suggest that policies have carryover
e¤ects beyond the year of policy implementation.
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correlation between antibiotic policies and antibiotic use either focus on specic
countries or do not use quantitative methods, as presented in section 2.
5.2 Other e¤ects of covariates
The coe¢ cient on physicians density deserves some comments since it is positive and
signicant in Model 2. An increase in physicians density by 0.1% increases antibiotic
consumption by 3.13 DID. The results might put forward some evidence of supply-
induced demand. However, the assumption of a positive relationship between the
amount of prescriptions and the number of doctors per capita does not necessarily
follow. It is known that countries with a greater number of doctors per inhabitant
use more antibiotics than countries with a smaller number of doctors per inhabitant
[35], and that doctors who spend more time with their patients prescribe fewer
antibiotics [36].
Although physicians are more informed than patients about drug resistance and
are ethically constrained to avoid unnecessary antibiotics, they may overprescribe
antimicrobials either to meet patients expectations or because they fear misdiagnos-
ing bacterial infections [37]. Patients usually regard antibiotics as a valid alternative
to anti-inammatory drugs for colds or u. They also su¤er from poor information
in relation to physicians and look for evidence of physicians quality. The physi-
cians willingness to prescribe antibiotics may then appear as a mark of quality [38].
Patients may fancy immediate treatment and the physician must decide between
prescribing or persuading the patient that a delay is appropriate.
We did not nd any signicant e¤ect of changes in the average national income.
Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient of income is positive in both regressions. Positive income
e¤ects for antimicrobials are observed by Baye et al. [39] using US data, Filippini
et al. [40] using aggregated Swiss data at small area level, and in a previous study
on European country data with a shorter time period, i.e. 2000-2005, than ours
[13]. Conversely, negative income e¤ects are found by Filippini et al. [41] using
Swiss data at cantonal level. One possible explanation for the relatively low value
of the coe¢ cient of income is that the increasing concern on the e¤ects of bacterial
resistance from the 1990s may have reduced income elasticity of outpatient antibiotic
expenditure over time. Another explanation is that high-income countries are more
16
likely to substitute away antibiotics for other treatments, ceteris paribus.
The pharmaceutical price index is not signicant. Generally, antibiotics are
perceived as necessary in the case of presumed bacterial infections. Furthermore,
antibiotics are purchased under doctors prescription and the share of price bore
directly by the patient is usually very low. Even without insurance coverage, the
cost to the patient would be low since most antibiotics are relatively cheap and
have to be taken for a short time. This may imply that individuals are not very
responsive to changes in antibiotic prices, although price demand elasticities may
also vary according to the type of antibiotic therapy, e.g. newer and more expensive
antibiotics are more price elastic than traditional ones [42].
The coe¢ cients of mortality rate for infectious diseases are not signicant. As for
demographic covariates, we only observe a signicant association between the pro-
portion of individuals aged 65-79 and increasing levels of antimicrobial consumption.
This result seems to support the hypothesis that increasing prevalence of chronic
health problems as people grow older may determine an increase in the utilization
of health care goods and services, including drugs. Di Matteo and Grootendorst
[43] also observe a slightly signicant increase in drug expenditure in the population
between 64 and 74, although the evidence is not conrmed by the more recent study
by Di Matteo [44].
6 Conclusion
Several studies show that a decrease in the use of antibiotics may reduce levels of
bacterial resistance. During the last decade, many European countries undertook
public health programs to optimize antibiotic use in the community. Nevertheless,
the e¤ectiveness of policies for a rationale use of antibiotics is still unclear. In
particular, the inuence of public campaigns on antimicrobial usage, and therefore
on bacterial resistance, has not been assessed accurately [12].
In this paper, we estimated the impact of antibiotic policies in Europe by means
of a di¤erences-in-di¤erences methodology. The approach allowed us to identify
the e¤ect of campaigns on antibiotic use by relating di¤erential changes in antibi-
otic consumption across countries and over time to changes in the relevant policy
variables.
17
The results provide some evidence that public campaigns represents an e¤ective
strategy to reduce the use of outpatient antibiotics. Countries that adopt public
campaigns succeed in terms of reducing their levels of antibiotic use over time.
Further research is necessary to assess the impact of policy interventions on the
levels of bacterial resistance through the reduction of antibiotic consumption.
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Figure 1: Antibiotic consumption and levels of bacterial resistance in PNSP (propor-
tion of penicillin-non-susceptible Streptococcus pneumoniae isolates) in 21 European
countries in 2005. Data source: European Surveillance of Antimicrobial Consump-






































Figure 2: Outpatient antibiotic use in DID (dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants
per day) for countries that did not implement any public campaign between 1997 and




































Figure 3: Outpatient antibiotic use in DID (dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants
per day) for countries that implemented public campaigns between 1997 and 2007
(years of campaign implementation are marked). Data source: European Surveil-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model 1 (Fixed e¤ects) Model 2 (2SLS)
Obs. 153 Obs. 148
Variables Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value
Constant 14.23987 10.84761 0.205 - - -
Y -0.000006 0.000076 0.937 0.000034 0.000104 0.742
INFt 1 -0.026964 0.131664 0.840 0.133130 0.159960 0.405
DPH 2.675357 1.745052 0.142 2.037980 1.287773 0.114
POP1 -0.149416 0.315799 0.642 0.939162 0.725505 0.195
POP2 -0.504244 0.330286 0.143 -0.518750 0.269742 0.054
POP4 1.739930 0.347879 0.000 1.732788 0.423205 0.000
POP5 -2.234688 1.780598 0.225 -0.977550 1.484881 0.510
P -0.047670 0.035893 0.200 -0.049779 0.041672 0.232
POLICY1 -1.278340 0.569823 0.037 -5.601114 2.320015 0.016
dt1 -0.665328 1.892860 0.729 -3.036271 2.490521 0.223
dt2 -1.319394 1.816378 0.476 -3.069590 2.242963 0.171
dt3 -1.579900 1.647785 0.350 -2.352010 1.796504 0.190
dt4 -1.062183 1.482873 0.483 -1.564164 1.528752 0.306
dt5 -1.516438 1.239671 0.236 -1.655402 1.324945 0.212
dt6 -1.278312 0.944794 0.192 -1.682968 1.067949 0.115
dt7 -1.827697 0.770119 0.028 -1.606953 0.800390 0.045
dt8 -0.848300 0.661260 0.215 -1.095777 0.693138 0.114
dt9 -1.381653 0.505751 0.013 -0.811843 0.537460 0.131
u 5.900249 - - - - -
e 1.152637 - - - - -
 0.963240 - - - - -
Y =income per capita. INFt 1=mortality for infectious diseases lagged one year. DPH=density
of doctors. POP1=population under 14. POP2=population 15-24. POP4=population 65-79.
POP5=population over 80. P=Price of pharmaceuticals. POLICY1=implementation of public
campaigns. dt1-dt9=time dummies. =standard deviation of common residuals. "=standard
deviation of unique (individual) residuals. =variance not explained by di¤erences across entities.
Table 2: Parameter estimates for di¤erences-in-di¤erences models of antibiotic con-
sumption.
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